全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24737
来源ID	Working Paper 24737
	Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks
	Patrick Bolton; Martin Oehmke
发表日期	2018-06-25
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We study the resolution of global banks by national regulators. Single-point-of-entry (SPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is shared across jurisdictions, is efficient but may not be implementable. First, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are too asymmetric, national regulators fail to set up SPOE resolution ex ante. Second, when required ex-post transfers are too large, national regulators ring-fence assets instead of cooperating in SPOE resolution. In this case, a multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) resolution, where loss-absorbing capital is preassigned, is more robust. Our analysis highlights a fundamental link between efficient bank resolution and the operational structures and risks of global banks.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24737
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582409
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Patrick Bolton,Martin Oehmke. Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks. 2018.