| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24751 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24751 |
| Banks as Potentially Crooked Secret-Keepers | |
| Timothy Jackson; Laurence J. Kotlikoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-25 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Bank failures are generally liquidity as well as solvency events. Whether it is households running on banks or banks running on banks, defunding episodes are full of drama. This theater has, arguably, lured economists into placing liquidity at the epicenter of financial collapse. But loss of liquidity describes how banks fail. Bad news about banks explains why they fail. This paper models banking crises as triggered by news that the degree (share) of banking malfeasance is likely to be particularly high. The malfeasance share follows a state-dependent Markov process. When this period’s share is high, agents rationally raise their probability that next period’s share will be high as well. Whether or not this proves true, agents invest less in banks, reducing intermediation and output. Deposit insurance prevents such defunding and stabilizes the economy. But it sustains bad banking, lowering welfare. Private monitoring helps, but is no panacea. It partially limits banking malfeasance. But it does so inefficiently as households needlessly replicate each others’ costly information acquisition. Moreover, if private audits become public, private monitoring breaks down due to free-riding. Government real-time disclosure of banking malfeasant mitigates, if not eliminates, this public goods problem leading to potentially large gains in both non-stolen output and welfare. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Business Cycles ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24751 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582423 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Timothy Jackson,Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Banks as Potentially Crooked Secret-Keepers. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24751.pdf（1242KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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