全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24791
来源ID	Working Paper 24791
	Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing
	Peter Q. Blair; Bobby W. Chung
发表日期	2018-07-16
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	In the presence of occupational licensing, we find evidence that firms rely less on observable characteristics such as race and gender in determining employee wages. As a result, licensed minorities and women experience smaller racial and gender wage gaps than their unlicensed peers. Black men benefit from licenses that are accessible to individuals without criminal records, whereas white women benefit from licenses with a human capital requirement. Certification, a less distortionary alternative to licensing, generates an equivalent wage premium for white men, but lower wage premiums than licensing for women and black men.
主题	Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Discrimination ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24791
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582465
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Peter Q. Blair,Bobby W. Chung. Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing. 2018.