全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): A Theory of Multihoming in Rideshare Competition

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24806
来源ID	Working Paper 24806
	A Theory of Multihoming in Rideshare Competition
	Kevin A. Bryan; Joshua S. Gans
发表日期	2018-07-16
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We examine competition amongst ridesharing platforms where firms compete by choosing both the price of rides and the extent of idleness. Idleness means drivers who are compensated without picking up passengers, instead acting to reduce passenger wait time. We show that when consumers are the only agents who multihome, idleness falls compared with when they face a monopoly ridesharing platform. When drivers and consumers multihome, idleness further falls to zero as it involves costs for each platform that are appropriated, in part, by their rival. Interestingly, socially superior outcomes may involve monopoly or competition under various multihoming regimes, depending on the density of the city, and the relative costs of idleness versus consumer disutility of waiting.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Regulatory Economics
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24806
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582480
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Kevin A. Bryan,Joshua S. Gans. A Theory of Multihoming in Rideshare Competition. 2018.