全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24830
来源ID	Working Paper 24830
	Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design
	Philippe Ruh; Stefan Staubli
发表日期	2018-07-16
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability—a notch—and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries’ earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic.
主题	Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Labor Supply and Demand
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24830
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582504
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Philippe Ruh,Stefan Staubli. Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design. 2018.