Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w24837 |
来源ID | Working Paper 24837 |
A Mechanism Design Approach to Identification and Estimation | |
Bradley Larsen; Anthony Lee Zhang | |
发表日期 | 2018-07-23 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper presents a two-step identification argument for a large class of quasilinear utility trading games, imputing agents' values using revealed preference based on their choices from a convex menu of expected outcomes available in equilibrium. This generalizes many existing two-step approaches in the auctions literature and applies to many cases for which there are no existing tools and where the econometrician may not know the precise rules of the game, such as incomplete-information bargaining settings. We also derive a methodology for settings in which agents' actions are not perfectly observed, bounding menus and agents' utilities based on features of the data that shift agents' imperfectly observed actions. We propose nonparametric value estimation procedures based on our identification results for general trading games. Our procedures can be combined with previously existing tools for handling unobserved heterogeneity and non-independent types. We apply our results to analyze efficiency and surplus division in the complex game played at wholesale used-car auctions, that of a secret reserve price auction followed by sequential bargaining between the seller and high bidder. |
主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24837 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582511 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bradley Larsen,Anthony Lee Zhang. A Mechanism Design Approach to Identification and Estimation. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w24837.pdf(864KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。