全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Eyes Wide Shut? The Moral Hazard of Mortgage Insurers during the Housing Boom

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24844
来源ID	Working Paper 24844
	Eyes Wide Shut? The Moral Hazard of Mortgage Insurers during the Housing Boom
	Neil Bhutta; Benjamin J. Keys
发表日期	2018-07-23
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	In the U.S. mortgage market, private mortgage insurance (PMI) is mandated for high-leverage mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to serve as a private market check on GSE risk-taking. However, we document that PMI firms dramatically expanded insurance on high-risk mortgages at the tail-end of the housing boom, contradicting the industry's own research regarding house price risk. Using three detailed sources of mortgage and insurance data, we examine PMI application denial rates, default rates on PMI-backed loans, and growth rates of high-leverage lending around the GSE conforming loan limit, along with information extracted from company, industry and regulatory filings and reports. We conclude that PMI behavior during the housing boom in part reflects a "moral hazard" incentive inherent to insurance companies in general to underprice risk and be undercapitalized. Our results suggest that rather than providing discipline, private mortgage insurers facilitated GSE risk-taking.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24844
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582518
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Neil Bhutta,Benjamin J. Keys. Eyes Wide Shut? The Moral Hazard of Mortgage Insurers during the Housing Boom. 2018.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w24844.pdf（1045KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览