| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24864 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24864 |
| No Free Lunch? Welfare Analysis of Firms Selling Through Expert Intermediaries | |
| Matthew Grennan; Kyle Myers; Ashley Swanson; Aaron Chatterji | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how firms target and influence expert intermediaries. In our empirical context, pharmaceutical manufacturers provide payments to physicians during promotional interactions. We develop an identification strategy based on plausibly exogenous variation in payments driven by differential exposure to spillovers from academic medical centers’ conflict-of-interest policies. Using a detailed case study of an important class of cardiovascular drugs, we estimate heterogeneous effects of payments on prescribing, with firms targeting highly responsive physicians. Our model of supply and demand allows us to quantify how oligopoly prices reduce drug prescribing, and how payments move prescribing closer to the optimal level, but at great financial cost to patients and payers. In our estimated model, consumers are worse off with payments, unless there is substantial underprescribing due to behavioral or other frictions. In a final exercise, we calibrate such frictions using clinical data. We estimate that, in this case study, payments benefit consumers. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24864 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582538 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Grennan,Kyle Myers,Ashley Swanson,et al. No Free Lunch? Welfare Analysis of Firms Selling Through Expert Intermediaries. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24864.pdf（668KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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