| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24888 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24888 |
| Priors rule: When do Malfeasance Revelations Help or Hurt Incumbent Parties? | |
| Eric Arias; Horacio Larreguy; John Marshall; Pablo Querubín | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-08-06 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Effective policy-making requires that voters avoid electing malfeasant politicians. However, as our simple learning model emphasizing voters’ prior beliefs and updating highlights, informing voters of incumbent malfeasance may not entail sanctioning. Specifically, electoral punishment of incumbents revealed to be malfeasant is rare where voters already believed them to be malfeasant, while information’s effect on turnout is non-linear in the magnitude of revealed malfeasance. These Bayesian predictions are supported by a field experiment informing Mexican voters about malfeasant mayoral spending before municipal elections. Given voters’ low expectations and initial uncertainty, as well as politician responses, relatively severe malfeasance revelations increased incumbent vote share on average. Consistent with voter learning, rewards were lower among voters with lower malfeasance priors, among voters with more precise prior beliefs, when audits revealed greater malfeasance, and among voters updating less favorably. Furthermore, both low and high malfeasance revelations increased turnout, while less surprising information reduced turnout. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24888 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582561 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eric Arias,Horacio Larreguy,John Marshall,et al. Priors rule: When do Malfeasance Revelations Help or Hurt Incumbent Parties?. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24888.pdf（999KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
