| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24914 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24914 |
| Quadratic Games | |
| Nicolas S. Lambert; Giorgio Martini; Michael Ostrovsky | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-08-20 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study general quadratic games with multidimensional actions, stochastic payoff interactions, and rich information structures. We first consider games with arbitrary finite information structures. In such games, we show that there generically exists a unique equilibrium. We then extend the result to games with infinite information structures, under an additional assumption of linearity of certain conditional expectations. In that case, there generically exists a unique linear equilibrium. In both cases, the equilibria can be explicitly characterized in compact closed form. We illustrate our results by studying information aggregation in large asymmetric Cournot markets and the effects of stochastic payoff interactions in beauty contests. Our results apply to general games with linear best responses, and also allow us to characterize the effects of small perturbations in arbitrary Bayesian games with finite information structures and smooth payoffs. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Mathematical Tools ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24914 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582588 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas S. Lambert,Giorgio Martini,Michael Ostrovsky. Quadratic Games. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24914.pdf（507KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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