全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Certification, Reputation and Entry: An Empirical Analysis

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24916
来源ID	Working Paper 24916
	Certification, Reputation and Entry: An Empirical Analysis
	Xiang Hui; Maryam Saeedi; Giancarlo Spagnolo; Steven Tadelis
发表日期	2018-08-20
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Markets with asymmetric information will often employ third-party certification labels to distinguish between higher and lower quality transactions, yet little is known about the effects of certification policies on the evolution of markets. How does the stringency in quality certification affect the intensity and composition of entry, incumbents' reactions, and market outcomes? We use detailed administrative data and exploit a policy change on eBay to explore how a more selective certification policy affects entry and behavior across a rich set of online market segments. We find that after the policy change, entry increases and does so more intensely in markets where it is harder to become certified. The average quality of entrants also increases more in the more affected markets, while the quality distribution of entrants exhibits fatter tails ex post. Finally, some incumbents increase the quality of their service to maintain certification and deliver higher quality after the policy change. The results help inform the design of certification policies in electronic and other markets with asymmetric information.
主题	Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Industry Studies
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24916
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582590
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Xiang Hui,Maryam Saeedi,Giancarlo Spagnolo,et al. Certification, Reputation and Entry: An Empirical Analysis. 2018.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w24916.pdf（1761KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览