| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24921 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24921 |
| Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis | |
| Guillaume R. Fréchette; Alessandro Lizzeri; Tobias Salz | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-08-20 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions created by the need for both market sides to physically search for trading partners, and second, regulatory limitations to entry. To assess the importance of these features, we use the model to simulate the effect of changes in entry, alternative matching technologies, and different market density. We use the geographical features of the matching process to back out unobserved demand through a matching simulation. This function exhibits increasing returns to scale, which is important to understand the impact of changes in this market and has welfare implications. For instance, although alternative dispatch platforms can be more efficient than street-hailing, platform competition is harmful because it reduces effective density. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24921 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582595 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillaume R. Fréchette,Alessandro Lizzeri,Tobias Salz. Frictions in a Competitive, Regulated Market: Evidence from Taxis. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24921.pdf（764KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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