| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24961 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24961 |
| Target setting and Allocative Inefficiency in Lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks | |
| Yiming Cao; Raymond Fisman; Hui Lin; Yongxiang Wang | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-03 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the consequences of month-end lending incentives for Chinese bank managers. Using data from two banks, one state-owned and the other partially privatized, we show a clear increase in lending in the final days of each month, a result of both more loan issuance and higher value per loan. We estimate that daily end-of-month lending is 95 percent higher in the last 5 days of each month as a result of loan targets, with only a small amount plausibly attributable to shifting loans forward from the following month. End-of-month loans are 2.1 percentage points (more than 16 percent) more likely to be classified as bad in the years following issuance; a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the incremental loans made in order to hit targets are 26 percent more likely to eventually turn bad. Our work highlights the distortionary effects of target-setting on capital allocation, in a context in which such concerns have risen to particular prominence in recent years. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24961 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582635 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yiming Cao,Raymond Fisman,Hui Lin,et al. Target setting and Allocative Inefficiency in Lending: Evidence from Two Chinese Banks. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24961.pdf（603KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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