全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): I Don't Know

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w24994
来源ID	Working Paper 24994
	I Don't Know
	Matthew Backus; Andrew Little
发表日期	2018-09-10
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Experts with reputational concerns, even good ones, are averse to admitting what they don’t know. This diminishes our trust in experts and, in turn, the role of science in society. We model the strategic communication of uncertainty, allowing for the salient reality that some questions are ill-posed or unanswerable. Combined with a new use of Markov sequential equilibrium, our model sheds new light on old results about the challenge of getting experts to admit uncertainty – even when it is possible to check predictive success. Moreover, we identify a novel solution: checking features of the problem itself that only good experts will infer – in particular, whether the problem is answerable – allows for equilibria where uninformed experts do say “I Don’t Know.”
主题	Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Firm Behavior
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w24994
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582668
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Matthew Backus,Andrew Little. I Don't Know. 2018.