| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w24998 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 24998 |
| For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Risk-taking in New England, 1867-1880 | |
| Peter Koudijs; Laura Salisbury; Gurpal Sran | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a legal change had more leverage, were more likely to "evergreen" loans and violate lending rules, and lost more capital and deposits in the Long Depression of 1873-1878. This effect was most pronounced for bankers with wives from relatively wealthy families. We find no evidence that limiting liability increased firm investment at the county level. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; History ; Financial History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w24998 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582672 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Koudijs,Laura Salisbury,Gurpal Sran. For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Risk-taking in New England, 1867-1880. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w24998.pdf（499KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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