| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25002 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25002 |
| Dynamics and Efficiency in Decentralized Online Auction Markets | |
| Kenneth Hendricks; Alan Sorensen | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Economic theory suggests that decentralized markets can achieve efficient outcomes if buyers and sellers have many opportunities to trade. We examine this idea empirically by developing a tractable dynamic model of bidding in an overlapping, sequential auction environment and estimating the model with detailed data from eBay. Bidders in the model discount their bids to reflect the option value of losing – if they lose, they can come back to try again – and the structure of the model makes it so they effectively bid against a stationary distribution of rivals. We find that dynamic participation makes the market meaningfully more efficient than a benchmark in which buyers have only one opportunity to bid, but the observed outcomes still fall well short of the fully efficient competitive equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25002 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582676 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kenneth Hendricks,Alan Sorensen. Dynamics and Efficiency in Decentralized Online Auction Markets. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25002.pdf（718KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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