全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Employer Credit Checks: Poverty Traps versus Matching Efficiency

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w25005
来源ID	Working Paper 25005
	Employer Credit Checks: Poverty Traps versus Matching Efficiency
	Dean Corbae; Andrew Glover
发表日期	2018-09-10
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a framework to understand pre-employment credit screening through adverse selection in labor and credit markets. Workers differ in an unobservable characteristic that induces a positive correlation between labor productivity and repayment rates in credit markets. Firms therefore prefer to hire workers with good credit because it correlates with high productivity. A poverty trap may arise, in which an unemployed worker with poor credit has a low job finding rate, but cannot improve her credit without a job. In our calibrated economy, this manifests as a large and persistent wage loss from default, equivalent to 2.3% per month over ten years. Banning employer credit checks eliminates the poverty trap, but pools job seekers and reduces matching efficiency: average unemployment duration rises by 13% for the most productive workers after employers are banned from using credit histories to screen potential hires.
主题	Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Money and Interest Rates
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w25005
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582679
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Dean Corbae,Andrew Glover. Employer Credit Checks: Poverty Traps versus Matching Efficiency. 2018.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w25005.pdf（711KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览