| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25011 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25011 |
| International Spillovers and Bailouts | |
| Marina Azzimonti; Vincenzo Quadrini | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how cross-country macroeconomic spillovers caused by sovereign default affect equilibrium bailouts. Because of portfolio diversification, the default of one country causes a macroeconomic contraction in countries that hold its debt, which could justify why a given country may want to bailout another. But why do creditor countries choose to bail out debtor countries instead of their own private sector? We show that this is because an external bailout could be cheaper than a domestic bailout. We also show that, although anticipated bailouts lead to higher borrowing, they can be Pareto improving not only ex-post (after a country has defaulted) but also ex-ante (before the country chooses its debt). |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25011 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582685 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marina Azzimonti,Vincenzo Quadrini. International Spillovers and Bailouts. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25011.pdf（3434KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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