| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25024 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25024 |
| Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism | |
| Umut M. Dur; Parag A. Pathak; Fei Song; Tayfun Sönmez | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-17 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the well-known Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25024 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582698 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Umut M. Dur,Parag A. Pathak,Fei Song,et al. Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25024.pdf（369KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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