全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w25033
来源ID	Working Paper 25033
	Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules
	Renee Bowen; Vincent Anesi
发表日期	2018-09-17
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than constraints on redistribution.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w25033
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582707
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Renee Bowen,Vincent Anesi. Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules. 2018.