| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w25048
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 25048
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| Macroprudential Policy with Leakages |
| Julien Bengui; Javier Bianchi
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| 发表日期 | 2018-09-17
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| 出版年 | 2018
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The outreach of macroprudential policies is likely limited in practice by imperfect regulation enforcement, whether due to shadow banking, regulatory arbitrage, or other regulation circumvention schemes. We study how such concerns affect the design of optimal regulatory policy in a workhorse model in which pecuniary externalities call for macroprudential taxes on debt, but with the addition of a novel constraint that financial regulators lack the ability to enforce taxes on a subset of agents. While regulated agents reduce risk taking in response to debt taxes, unregulated agents react to the safer environment by taking on more risk. These leakages undermine the effectiveness of macruprudential taxes but do not necessarily call for weaker interventions. A quantitative analysis of the model suggests that aggregate welfare gains and reductions in the severity and frequency of financial crises remain, on average, largely unaffected by even significant leakages. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; International Economics
; International Finance
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25048
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582722
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Julien Bengui,Javier Bianchi. Macroprudential Policy with Leakages. 2018.
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文件名：
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w25048.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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