| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25073 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25073 |
| History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt | |
| Pablo D'; Erasmo; Enrique G. Mendoza | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-24 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Infrequent but turbulent overt sovereign defaults on domestic creditors are a “forgotten history” in Macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which the government chooses optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives v. the social value of debt for self-insurance, liquidity, and risk-sharing. A rich feedback mechanism links debt issuance, the distribution of debt holdings, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Eurozone data, the model is consistent with key long-run and debt-crisis statistics. Defaults are rare (1.2 percent frequency), and preceded by surging debt and spreads. Debt sells at the risk-free price most of the time, but the government's lack of commitment reduces sustainable debt sharply. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Fiscal Policy ; International Economics ; International Finance ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25073 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582746 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pablo D',Erasmo,Enrique G. Mendoza. History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25073.pdf（916KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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