| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25096 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25096 |
| Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms | |
| Adam Kapor; Christopher A. Neilson; Seth D. Zimmerman | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households’ belief accuracy. We find that a switch to truthful reporting in the DA mechanism offers welfare improvements over the baseline given the belief errors we observe in the data, but that an analyst who assumed families had accurate beliefs would have reached the opposite conclusion. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25096 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582769 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Adam Kapor,Christopher A. Neilson,Seth D. Zimmerman. Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25096.pdf（846KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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