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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w25097 |
来源ID | Working Paper 25097 |
The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets | |
Andres Liberman; Christopher Neilson; Luis Opazo; Seth Zimmerman | |
发表日期 | 2018-10-01 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper studies the equilibrium effects of information restrictions in credit markets using a large-scale natural experiment. In 2012, Chilean credit bureaus were forced to stop reporting defaults for 2.8 million individuals (21% of the adult population). Using panel data on the universe of bank borrowers in Chile combined with the deleted registry information, we implement machine learning techniques to measure changes in the predictions lenders can make about default rates following deletion. Deletion lowers (raises) predicted default the most for poorer defaulters (non-defaulters) with limited borrowing histories. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that individuals exposed to increases in predicted default reduce borrowing by 6.4% following deletion, while those exposed to decreases raise borrowing by 11.8%. In aggregate, deletion reduces borrowing by 3.5%. Taking the difference-in-difference estimates as inputs into a model of borrowing under adverse selection, we find that deletion reduces surplus under a variety of assumptions about lenders' pricing strategies. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25097 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582770 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andres Liberman,Christopher Neilson,Luis Opazo,et al. The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w25097.pdf(606KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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