| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25124 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25124 |
| Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality | |
| Andreas Kuhn; Stefan Staubli; Jean-Philippe Wuellrich; Josef Zweimüller | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the causal effect of permanent and premature exits from the labor force on mortality. To overcome the problem of negative health selection into early retirement, we exploit a policy change in unemployment insurance rules in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to exit the labor force 3 years earlier compared to workers in non-eligible regions. Using administrative data with precise information on mortality and retirement, we find that the policy change induced eligible workers to exit the labor force significantly earlier. Instrumental variable estimation results show that for men retiring one year earlier causes a 6.8% increase in the risk of premature death and 0.2 years reduction in the age at death, but has no significant effect for women. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25124 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582798 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas Kuhn,Stefan Staubli,Jean-Philippe Wuellrich,et al. Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25124.pdf（743KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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