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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w25135 |
来源ID | Working Paper 25135 |
Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction | |
Jason Sandvik; Richard Saouma; Nathan Seegert; Christopher Stanton | |
发表日期 | 2018-10-08 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Firms rarely cut compensation, so little is known about the after-effects when compensation reductions do occur. We use commission reductions at a sales firm to estimate how work effort and turnover change. In response to an 18% decline in sales commissions, corresponding to a 7% decline in median take-home pay, we find turnover increases for the most productive workers. We detect limited effort responses. Turnover and effort responses do not differ based on workers' survey replies regarding expectations of firm fairness or future promotion. The findings indicate that adverse selection concerns on the extensive margin of retaining workers drive the empirical regularity that firms rarely reduce compensation. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25135 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582809 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jason Sandvik,Richard Saouma,Nathan Seegert,et al. Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w25135.pdf(572KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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