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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25135
来源IDWorking Paper 25135
Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction
Jason Sandvik; Richard Saouma; Nathan Seegert; Christopher Stanton
发表日期2018-10-08
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要Firms rarely cut compensation, so little is known about the after-effects when compensation reductions do occur. We use commission reductions at a sales firm to estimate how work effort and turnover change. In response to an 18% decline in sales commissions, corresponding to a 7% decline in median take-home pay, we find turnover increases for the most productive workers. We detect limited effort responses. Turnover and effort responses do not differ based on workers' survey replies regarding expectations of firm fairness or future promotion. The findings indicate that adverse selection concerns on the extensive margin of retaining workers drive the empirical regularity that firms rarely reduce compensation.
主题Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25135
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582809
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GB/T 7714
Jason Sandvik,Richard Saouma,Nathan Seegert,et al. Analyzing the Aftermath of a Compensation Reduction. 2018.
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