| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25137 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25137 |
| Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico\u2019s Labor Courts | |
| Joyce Sadka; Enrique Seira; Christopher Woodruff | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-08 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Well-functioning courts are essential for the health of both financial and real economies. Courts function poorly in most lower-income countries, but the root causes of poor performance are not well understood. We use a field experiment with ongoing cases to analyze sources of dysfunction in Mexico’s largest labor court. Providing the parties with personalized outcome predictions doubles settlement rates and reduces average case duration, but only when the worker is present to receive the information. An intervention before plaintiffs contact a lawyer increases pre-suit settlement. The experiment illuminates agency issues among plaintiffs with private lawyers. For most workers, the treatment appears to improve welfare, as measured by discounted payouts and ability to pay bills. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25137 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582811 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joyce Sadka,Enrique Seira,Christopher Woodruff. Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico\u2019s Labor Courts. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25137.pdf（1155KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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