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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25145
来源IDWorking Paper 25145
The Salary Taboo: Privacy Norms and the Diffusion of Information
Zoë B. Cullen; Ricardo Perez-Truglia
发表日期2018-10-15
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要The limited diffusion of salary information has implications for labor markets, such as wage discrimination policies and collective bargaining. Access to salary information is believed to be limited and unequal, but there is little direct evidence on the sources of these information frictions. Social scientists have long conjectured that privacy norms around salary (i.e., the “salary taboo”) play an important role. We provide unique evidence of this phenomenon based on a field experiment with 755 employees at a large commercial bank from Southeast Asia. We provide revealed-preference evidence that many employees are unwilling to reveal their salaries to coworkers and reluctant to ask coworkers about their salaries. These frictions are still present, but smaller in magnitude, when sharing information that is less sensitive (seniority information). We discuss implications for pay transparency policies and the gender wage gap.
主题Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Discrimination ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Culture
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25145
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582818
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Zoë B. Cullen,Ricardo Perez-Truglia. The Salary Taboo: Privacy Norms and the Diffusion of Information. 2018.
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