| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25145 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25145 |
| The Salary Taboo: Privacy Norms and the Diffusion of Information | |
| Zoë B. Cullen; Ricardo Perez-Truglia | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-15 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The limited diffusion of salary information has implications for labor markets, such as wage discrimination policies and collective bargaining. Access to salary information is believed to be limited and unequal, but there is little direct evidence on the sources of these information frictions. Social scientists have long conjectured that privacy norms around salary (i.e., the “salary taboo”) play an important role. We provide unique evidence of this phenomenon based on a field experiment with 755 employees at a large commercial bank from Southeast Asia. We provide revealed-preference evidence that many employees are unwilling to reveal their salaries to coworkers and reluctant to ask coworkers about their salaries. These frictions are still present, but smaller in magnitude, when sharing information that is less sensitive (seniority information). We discuss implications for pay transparency policies and the gender wage gap. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Discrimination ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Culture |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25145 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582818 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zoë B. Cullen,Ricardo Perez-Truglia. The Salary Taboo: Privacy Norms and the Diffusion of Information. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25145.pdf（648KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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