| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25178 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25178 |
| Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long Term Care | |
| Martin B. Hackmann; R. Vincent Pohl | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-22 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How do patient and provider incentives affect mode and cost of long-term care? Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable out-of-pocket payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients, so moving to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective in shortening Medicaid stays than increasing resident cost-sharing. Moreover, we do not find evidence for health improvements due to longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25178 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582852 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin B. Hackmann,R. Vincent Pohl. Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long Term Care. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25178.pdf（964KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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