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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w25237 |
来源ID | Working Paper 25237 |
Political Discretion and Antitrust Policy: Evidence from the Assassination of President McKinley | |
Richard B. Baker; Carola Frydman; Eric Hilt | |
发表日期 | 2018-11-12 |
出版年 | 2018 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the importance of discretion in antitrust enforcement by analyzing the response of asset prices to the sudden accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency. During McKinley’s term in office the largest wave of merger activity in American history occurred, and his administration did not attempt to use antitrust laws to restrain any of those mergers. His vice president, Theodore Roosevelt, was known to be a Progressive reformer and much more interested in controlling anticompetitive behavior. We find that firms with greater vulnerability to antitrust enforcement saw greater declines in their abnormal returns following McKinley’s assassination. The transition from McKinley to Roosevelt caused one of the most significant changes in antitrust enforcement of the Gilded Age—not from new legislation, but from a change in the approach taken to the enforcement of existing law. Our results highlight the importance of enforcement efforts in antitrust. |
主题 | History ; Macroeconomic History ; Financial History ; Labor and Health History ; Other History |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25237 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582911 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard B. Baker,Carola Frydman,Eric Hilt. Political Discretion and Antitrust Policy: Evidence from the Assassination of President McKinley. 2018. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w25237.pdf(349KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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