全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Reputation Cycles and Earnings Dynamics

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w25252
来源ID	Working Paper 25252
	Reputation Cycles and Earnings Dynamics
	Boyan Jovanovic; Julien Prat
发表日期	2018-11-12
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Cyclical patterns in earnings can arise when contracts between firms and their workers are incomplete, and when workers cannot borrow or lend so as to smooth their consumption. Earnings cycles generate occasional large changes in earnings, consistent with some recent empirical findings. At the calibrated parameter values, financial constraints promote investment in reputation – an intangible capital form – in contrast to their documented inhibiting effect on investment in tangible capital.
主题	Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w25252
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582926
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Boyan Jovanovic,Julien Prat. Reputation Cycles and Earnings Dynamics. 2018.