| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25279 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25279 |
| Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India | |
| Jessica Goldberg; Mario Macis; Pradeep Chintagunta | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study whether and how peer referrals increase screening, testing, and identification of patients with tuberculosis, an infectious disease responsible for over one million deaths annually. In an experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment centers in India, we find that small financial incentives raise the probability that existing patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in cost-effective identification of new cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks to target for outreach, and they are more effective than health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25279 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582953 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jessica Goldberg,Mario Macis,Pradeep Chintagunta. Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25279.pdf（560KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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