| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25300 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25300 |
| In the Shadows of the Government: Relationship Building During Political Turnovers | |
| Hanming Fang; Zhe Li; Nianhang Xu; Hongjun Yan | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially private firms) headquartered in that city significantly increase their "perk spending." Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. Moreover, local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of Chairmen or CEOs of state-owned firms that are controlled by the local government. However, the Chairmen or CEOs who have connections with local government officials are less likely to be replaced. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25300 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/582974 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hanming Fang,Zhe Li,Nianhang Xu,et al. In the Shadows of the Government: Relationship Building During Political Turnovers. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25300.pdf（958KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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