| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25337 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25337 |
| The Benchmark Inclusion Subsidy | |
| Anil K. Kashyap; Natalia Kovrijnykh; Jian Li; Anna Pavlova | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that the pervasive practice of evaluating portfolio managers relative to a benchmark has real effects. Benchmarking generates additional, inelastic demand for assets inside the benchmark. This leads to a “benchmark inclusion subsidy:” a firm inside the benchmark values an investment project more than the one outside. The same wedge arises for valuing M&A, spinoffs, and IPOs. This overturns the proposition that an investment’s value is independent of the entity considering it. We describe the characteristics that determine the subsidy, quantify its size (which could be large), and identify empirical work supporting our model’s predictions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25337 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583010 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anil K. Kashyap,Natalia Kovrijnykh,Jian Li,et al. The Benchmark Inclusion Subsidy. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25337.pdf（1435KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
