| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25352 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25352 |
| Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less? | |
| Kornelia Fabisik; Rüdiger Fahlenbrach; René M. Stulz; Jérôme P. Taillard | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-10 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using more than 50,000 firm-years from 1988 to 2015, we show that the empirical relation between a firm’s Tobin’s q and managerial ownership is systematically negative. When we restrict our sample to larger firms as in the prior literature, our findings are consistent with the literature, showing that there is an increasing and concave relation between q and managerial ownership. We show that these seemingly contradictory results are explained by cumulative past performance and liquidity. Better performing firms have more liquid equity, which enables insiders to more easily sell shares after the IPO, and they also have a higher Tobin’s q. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25352 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583025 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kornelia Fabisik,Rüdiger Fahlenbrach,René M. Stulz,et al. Why are Firms with More Managerial Ownership Worth Less?. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25352.pdf（608KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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