G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25376
来源IDWorking Paper 25376
Organizational Equilibrium with Capital
Marco Bassetto; Zhen Huo; José-Víctor Ríos-Rull
发表日期2018-12-24
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept – organizational equilibrium – for models with state variables that have a time-inconsistency problem. The key elements of this equilibrium concept are: (1) agents are allowed to ignore the history and restart the equilibrium; (2) agents can wait for future agents to start the equilibrium. We apply this equilibrium concept to a quasi-geometric discounting growth model and to a problem of optimal dynamic fiscal policy. We find that the allocation gradually transits from that implied by its Markov perfect equilibrium towards that implied by the solution under commitment, but stopping short of the Ramsey outcome. The feature that the time inconsistency problem is resolved slowly over time rationalizes the notion that good will is valuable but has to be built gradually.
主题Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25376
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583050
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marco Bassetto,Zhen Huo,José-Víctor Ríos-Rull. Organizational Equilibrium with Capital. 2018.
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