| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25376 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25376 |
| Organizational Equilibrium with Capital | |
| Marco Bassetto; Zhen Huo; José-Víctor Ríos-Rull | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept – organizational equilibrium – for models with state variables that have a time-inconsistency problem. The key elements of this equilibrium concept are: (1) agents are allowed to ignore the history and restart the equilibrium; (2) agents can wait for future agents to start the equilibrium. We apply this equilibrium concept to a quasi-geometric discounting growth model and to a problem of optimal dynamic fiscal policy. We find that the allocation gradually transits from that implied by its Markov perfect equilibrium towards that implied by the solution under commitment, but stopping short of the Ramsey outcome. The feature that the time inconsistency problem is resolved slowly over time rationalizes the notion that good will is valuable but has to be built gradually. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25376 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583050 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Bassetto,Zhen Huo,José-Víctor Ríos-Rull. Organizational Equilibrium with Capital. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25376.pdf（1344KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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