| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25389 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25389 |
| Social Proximity and Bureaucrat Performance: Evidence from India | |
| Guo Xu; Marianne Bertrand; Robin Burgess | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using exogenous variation in social proximity generated by an allocation rule, we find that bureaucrats assigned to their home states are perceived to be more corrupt and less able to withstand illegitimate political pressure. Despite this, we observe that home officers are more likely to be promoted in the later stages of their careers. To understand this dissonance between performance and promotion we show that incoming Chief Ministers preferentially promote home officers that come from the same home district. Taken together, our results suggest that social proximity hampers bureaucrat performance by facilitating political capture and corruption. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures ; Development and Growth ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25389 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583063 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guo Xu,Marianne Bertrand,Robin Burgess. Social Proximity and Bureaucrat Performance: Evidence from India. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25389.pdf（820KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
