| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25391 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25391 |
| Are Energy Executives Rewarded For Luck? | |
| Lucas W. Davis; Catherine Hausman | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-24 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper, we examine executive compensation data from 78 major U.S. oil and gas companies over a 24-year period. Perhaps in no other industry are the fortunes of so many executives so dependent on a single global commodity price. We find that a 10% increase in oil prices is associated with a 2% increase in executive compensation. This oil price effect holds for both CEOs and non-CEOs and separately for several different individual components of compensation, including bonuses. We find that the oil price effect is larger in companies with more insiders on the board, and asymmetric, with executive compensation rising with increasing oil prices more than it falls with decreasing oil prices. We then discuss potential mechanisms drawn from the broader existing literature on executive compensation. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25391 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583065 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucas W. Davis,Catherine Hausman. Are Energy Executives Rewarded For Luck?. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25391.pdf（475KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
