G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w25395
来源IDWorking Paper 25395
Inequality and Market Concentration, When Shareholding is More Skewed than Consumption
Joshua Gans; Andrew Leigh; Martin Schmalz; Adam Triggs
发表日期2018-12-24
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要Economic theory suggests that monopoly prices hurt consumers but benefit shareholders. But in a world where individuals or households can be both consumers and shareholders, the impact of market power on inequality depends in part on the relative distribution of consumption and corporate equity ownership across individuals or households. The paper calculates this distribution for the United States, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, spanning nearly three decades from 1989 to 2016. In 2016, the top 20 percent consumed approximately as much as the bottom 60 percent, but had 13 times as much corporate equity. Because ownership is more skewed than consumption, increased mark-ups increase inequality. Moreover, over time, corporate equity has become even more skewed relative to consumption.
主题Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25395
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583069
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GB/T 7714
Joshua Gans,Andrew Leigh,Martin Schmalz,et al. Inequality and Market Concentration, When Shareholding is More Skewed than Consumption. 2018.
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