| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25404 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25404 |
| Managing Expectations: Instruments vs. Targets | |
| George-Marios Angeletos; Karthik A. Sastry | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Should policymakers offer forward guidance in terms of a path for an instrument such as interest rates or a target for an outcome such as unemployment? We study how the optimal approach depends on a departure from rational expectations. People have a limited understanding of the behavior of others and of the general equilibrium (GE) effects of policy. The bite of such bounded rationality on implementability and welfare is minimized by target-based guidance if and only if GE feedbacks are strong enough. This offers a rationale for why central banks should shine the spotlight on unemployment when faced with a prolonged liquidity trap, a steep Keynesian cross, or a large financial accelerator. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25404 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583078 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | George-Marios Angeletos,Karthik A. Sastry. Managing Expectations: Instruments vs. Targets. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25404.pdf（612KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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