| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25407 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25407 |
| Blockchain Economics | |
| Joseph Abadi; Markus Brunnermeier | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-31 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The fundamental problem in digital record-keeping is to establish consensus on an update to a ledger, e.g., a payment. Consensus must be achieved in the presence of faults—situations in which some computers are offline or fail to function appropriately. Traditional centralized record-keeping systems rely on trust in a single entity to achieve consensus. Blockchains decentralize record-keeping, dispensing with the need for trust in a single entity, but some instead build a consensus based on the wasteful expenditure of computational resources (proof-of-work). An ideal method of consensus would be tolerant to faults, avoid the waste of computational resources, and be capable of implementing all individually rational transfers of value among agents. We prove a Blockchain Trilemma: any method of consensus, be it centralized or decentralized, must give up (i) fault-tolerance, (ii) resource-efficiency, or (iii) full transferability. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25407 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583081 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Joseph Abadi,Markus Brunnermeier. Blockchain Economics. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25407.pdf（686KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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