| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25450 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25450 |
| The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts | |
| Barney Hartman-Glaser; Benjamin M. Hébert | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-14 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The lender is risk averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower. The borrower, however, might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state. We provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a non-indexed contract instead. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25450 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583124 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Barney Hartman-Glaser,Benjamin M. Hébert. The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25450.pdf（279KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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