| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25454 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25454 |
| Common Ownership in America: 1980-2017 | |
| Matthew Backus; Christopher Conlon; Michael Sinkinson | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-14 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When competing firms possess overlapping sets of investors, maximizing shareholder value may provide incentives that distort competitive behavior, affecting pricing, entry, contracting, and virtually all strategic interactions among firms. We propose a structurally consistent and scaleable approach to the measurement of this phenomenon for the universe of S&P 500 firms between 1980 and 2017. Over this period, the incentives implied by the common ownership hypothesis have grown dramatically. Contrary to popular intuition, this is not primarily associated with the rise of BlackRock and Van- guard: instead, the trend in the time series is driven by a broader rise in diversified investment strategies, of which these firms are only the most recent incarnation. In the cross-section, there is substantial variation that can be traced, both in the theory and the data, to observable firm characteristics – particularly the share of the firm held by retail investors. Finally, we show how common ownership can theoretically give rise to incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the “widely held firm.” |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Firm Behavior |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25454 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583127 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Backus,Christopher Conlon,Michael Sinkinson. Common Ownership in America: 1980-2017. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25454.pdf（1320KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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