全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w25463
来源ID	Working Paper 25463
	Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement
	Marina Halac; Pierre Yared
发表日期	2019-01-21
出版年	2019
语种	英语
摘要	We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we examine rules under limited enforcement: the government has full policy discretion and can only be incentivized to comply with a rule via the use of penalties which are joint and bounded. We show that optimal incentives must be bang-bang. Moreover, under a distributional condition, the optimal rule is a maximally enforced deficit limit, triggering the largest feasible penalty whenever violated. Violation optimally occurs under high enough shocks if and only if available penalties are weak and such shocks are rare. If the rule is self-enforced in a dynamic setting, penalties take the form of temporary overspending.
主题	Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Fiscal Policy ; Public Economics ; Other ; Economic Systems
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w25463
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583137
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement. 2019.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w25463.pdf（801KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览