| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25467 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25467 |
| Securities Laws, Bank Monitoring, and the Choice Between Cov-lite Loans and Bonds for Highly Levered | |
| Robert Prilmeier; René M. Stulz | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In contrast to bonds, cov-lite loans do not require SEC registration and are not subject to securities laws. We show that this distinction plays an important role in firms’ choice between funding through cov-lite loans and bonds and helps understand why the market share of cov-lite loans has been so high in recent normal times. Compared to cov-heavy loans, cov-lite loans are closer substitutes for bonds in that they have similar covenants, have tighter bid-ask spreads, have more trading, and are more likely to be used to refinance bonds than cov-heavy loans. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25467 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583141 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Prilmeier,René M. Stulz. Securities Laws, Bank Monitoring, and the Choice Between Cov-lite Loans and Bonds for Highly Levered. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25467.pdf（779KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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