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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w25473 |
来源ID | Working Paper 25473 |
Active Choice, Implicit Defaults, and the Incentive to Choose | |
John Beshears; James J. Choi; David Laibson; Brigitte C. Madrian | |
发表日期 | 2019-01-21 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Home-delivered prescriptions have no delivery charge and lower copayments than prescriptions picked up at a pharmacy. Nevertheless, when home delivery is offered on an opt-in basis, the take-up rate is only 6%. We study a program that makes active choice of either home delivery or pharmacy pick-up a requirement for insurance eligibility. The program introduces an implicit default for those who don’t make an active choice: pharmacy pick-up without insurance subsidies. Under this program, 42% of eligible employees actively choose home delivery, 39% actively choose pharmacy pick-up, and 19% make no active choice and are assigned the implicit default. Individuals who financially benefit most from home delivery are more likely to choose it. Those who benefit least from insurance subsidies are more likely to make no active choice and lose those subsidies. The implicit default incentivizes people to make an active choice, thereby playing a key role in choice architecture. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25473 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583147 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John Beshears,James J. Choi,David Laibson,et al. Active Choice, Implicit Defaults, and the Incentive to Choose. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w25473.pdf(244KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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