| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25520 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25520 |
| Optimal Corporate Taxation Under Financial Frictions | |
| Eduardo Dávila; Benjamin M. Hébert | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-04 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the optimal design of corporate taxes when firms have private information about future investment opportunities and face financial constraints. A government whose goal is to efficiently raise a given amount of revenue from its corporate sector should attempt to tax unconstrained firms, which value resources inside the firm less than financially constrained firms. We show that a corporate payout tax (a tax on dividends and share repurchases) can both separate constrained and unconstrained firms and raise revenue, and is therefore optimal. Our quantitative analysis implies that a revenue-neutral switch from profit taxation to payout taxation would increase the overall value of existing firms and new entrants by 7%. This switch could be implemented in the current U.S. tax system by making retained earnings fully deductible. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25520 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583194 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Eduardo Dávila,Benjamin M. Hébert. Optimal Corporate Taxation Under Financial Frictions. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25520.pdf（984KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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