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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w25566 |
来源ID | Working Paper 25566 |
Visibility Bias in the Transmission of Consumption Beliefs and Undersaving | |
Bing Han; David Hirshleifer; Johan Walden | |
发表日期 | 2019-02-18 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We model visibility bias in the social transmission of consumption behavior. When consumption is more salient than non-consumption, people perceive that others are consuming heavily, and infer that future prospects are favorable. This increases aggregate consumption in a positive feedback loop. A distinctive implication is that disclosure policy interventions can ameliorate undersaving. In contrast with wealth-signaling models, information asymmetry about wealth reduces overconsumption. The model predicts that saving is influenced by social connectedness, observation biases, and demographic structure; and provides new insight into savings rates. These predictions are distinct from other common models of consumption distortions. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Behavioral Finance |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25566 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583240 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bing Han,David Hirshleifer,Johan Walden. Visibility Bias in the Transmission of Consumption Beliefs and Undersaving. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w25566.pdf(737KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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