| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25575 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25575 |
| Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion | |
| Timothy Besley; Anders Jensen; Torsten Persson | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predictions on the dynamics of evasion. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25575 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Timothy Besley,Anders Jensen,Torsten Persson. Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25575.pdf（463KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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