| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w25592 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 25592 |
| Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools | |
| Lin William Cong; Zhiguo He; Jiasun Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The rise of centralized mining pools for risk sharing does not necessarily undermine the decentralization required for permissionless blockchains: Each individual miner's cross-pool diversification and endogenous fees charged by pools generally sustain decentralization, because larger pools better internalize their externality on global hash rates, charge higher fees, attract disproportionately fewer miners, and thus grow more slowly. Instead, mining pools as a financial innovation escalate the arms race among competing miners and thus significantly increase the energy consumption of proof-of-work-based consensus mechanisms. Empirical evidence from Bitcoin mining supports our model predictions. The economic insights inform many other blockchain protocols as well as the industrial organization of mainstream sectors with similar characteristics but ambiguous prior findings. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Antitrust |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w25592 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/583266 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lin William Cong,Zhiguo He,Jiasun Li. Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w25592.pdf（938KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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